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BOOK REVIEW
DEATH PENALTIES-THE SUPREME COURT'S OBSTACLE
COURSE BY RAOuL BERGER. CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS: HAR-
VARD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1982. Pp. 242. $17.50.
David L. Gregory*
Death Penalties, by Harvard Law School Professor Emeritus Raoul Berger,
an eminent constitutional law scholar,' is an important, disturbing book.
Despite an incredible 852 footnotes,2 relative to only 204 pages of primary
text, the book certainly does not fall squarely within conventional legal
academic scholarship. It is an advocate's brief more than it is a theoretical
examination of the issue of capital punishment. Death Penalties is a narrow
sequel to Berger's controversial study, Government By Judiciary.3 Berger's
overarching thesis is that the judiciary has unconstitutionally usurped the
powers of the legislature, via unwarranted and illegitimate judicial distor-
tion of the fourteenth amendment. "In short, the Court has engaged in
rewriting the Constitution, exercising a power not granted to it, identifying
its own predilections with constitutional imperatives."
4
Berger critically analyzes unprincipled judicial interference with state ad-
ministration of the death penalty. He argues that the Court's convoluted,
activist decisions5 have unconstitutionally compromised the fundamental tenth
* Assistant Professor of Law, St. John's University Law School; B.A., with honors
Catholic University of America; M.B.A., Wayne State University; J.D., magna cum laude Univer-
sity of Detroit; LL.M., Yale University Law School.
1. Berger has written numerous books and articles in the field of Constitutional law. See
R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT (1969); R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT By JUDICIARY:
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977) [hereinafter cited as GOVERN-
MENT By JUDICIARY]; R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS (1973); Berger,
Paul Brest's Brief for an Imperial Judiciary, 40 MD. L. REV. 1 (1981); Berger, Incorporation
of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment: A Nine-Lived Cat, 4:2 OHIO ST. L.J. 435
(1981); Berger, Ely's Theory of Judicial Review, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 87 (1981); Berger, Congres-
sional Contraction of Federal Jurisdiction, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 801; Berger, The Fourteenth
Amendment: Light from the Fifteenth, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 311 (1979).
2. Similar to Professor Berger's admission in an earlier book, he has piled "proof on
proof, even at the risk of tedium." GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 1, at 8.
3. A representative sampling of critical reaction to Professor Berger's GOVERNMENT By
JUDICIARY, supra note 1,includes, but is certainly not limited to, the following reviews of the
book: Bridwell, Book Review, DUKE L.J. 907 (1978); Clark, Book Review, 56 TEX. L. REV.
947 (1978); Murphy, Book Review, 87 YALE L.J. 1752 (1978); Perry, Book Review, 78 COLUM.
L. REV. 685 (1978); Tao, Book Review, 55 U. DET. J. URB. LAW 497 (1978).
4. R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES-THE SUPREME COURT'S OBSTACLE COURSE 158 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as DEATH PENALTIES].
5. Berger's analysis concentrates on two landmark capital punishment cases decided by
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amendment right of the states to administer their criminal law with respon-
sible autonomy. 6Additionally, Berger maintains that the Court has unconstitu-
tionally expanded the meaning of the cruel and unusual punishment clause
of the eighth amendment far beyond the narrow intent of the Framers.7 Ac-
cording to Berger:
The Court's revision of the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause is
but one more arrogation of power under the aegis of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but another chapter in the tale of judicial make-believe.
. . . Control of death penalities and of the sentencing process, it may
confidently be asserted, was left by the Constitution to the States.'
State legislatures have not been oblivious to federal judicial intrusion into
the administration of criminal law. In a de facto repudiation of the Furman
v. Georgia9 decision, thirty five states immediately reenacted the death
penalty." Further, the states have struggled valiantly against judicial social
engineering. ' The people, through the state legislatures, and not the im-
perial federal courts, have the sole power to constitutionally abrogate capital
punishment.
Unfortunately, Berger's important analysis suffers from disjointed, in-
cohesive scholarship. Despite sophisticated research and intimate knowledge
of the plethora of relevant literature, Berger hurries his theoretical inquiry.
Dispassionate academic examination of the constitutionality of the death
penalty is a remote, secondary concern to Berger. Having marshalled
the Supreme Court-McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971) and Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
In McGautha, the Court held that the jury has absolute discretion to decide whether the
criminal defendant should live or die and that the absence of any standards to guide the jury
is not violative of the Constitution. Fourteen months later, however, five members of the Court
in Furman held that standards to guide the jury's discretion regarding the imposition of the
death penalty are required by the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amend-
ment. 408 U.S. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring), Id. at 305-6 (Brennan, J., concurring),
Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring), Id. at 314 (White, J., concurring), Id. at 370 (Marshall,
J., concurring).
6. DEATH PENALTIES, supra note 4, at 109. According to Berger, the tenth amendment
raises a presumption that control over matters of local concern is reserved to the states and
can be overcome only by clear language manifesting the states' intention to surrender such control.
7. DEATH PENALTIES, supra note 4, at 7 n.23. "An unbroken line of interpreters has held
that it was the original understanding and intent of the framers of the Eighth Amendment
.. . to proscribe as 'cruel and unusual' only such modes of execution as compound the simple
infliction of death with added cruelties and indignities." Id.
8. Id. at 8-9.
9. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). For a brief discussion of the per curiam holding,
see supra note 5. See also infra note 35.
10. DEATH PENALTIES at 7 n.23. " 'According to a Gallup poll published in March [1981],
two-thirds of all Americans, the highest percentage in 28 years, favor the death penalty for
murder.' New York Times, June 14, 1981, p. 28. More significantly, the majority of the States
speedily repudiated Furman by reenacting death penalties in what they thought would be accep-
table terms."
11. DEATH PENALTIES, supra note 4, at 7 n.23.
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voluminous data which purportedly supports his conclusions, Berger quickly
proceeds to the primary purpose of his book-an indictment of the Supreme
Court's illegitimate law-making, via its unconstitutional and egregious judicial
distortion of the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. 2 Rather than fashion
his academic analysis from an Archimedean position, Berger writes a vitriolic
advocate's brief. There are frequent and scathing ad hominem attacks upon
his activist critics.' 3 Footnotes are used in an endless litany to bolster argu-
ment, rather than to elucidate legal analysis. Regrettably, this results in
disconcerting reading. Apart from these negative stylistics, however, Death
Penalties is a timely book on one of the most fundamental constitutional
questions in American jurisprudence.'"
Berger begins by debunking the activist theories that the fourteenth amend-
ment incorporated the Bill of Rights either in whole or in part.'5 Rather,
Berger posits that the Framers of both the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth
amendment were firmly devoted to the principle of inviolate state sovereignty
within the federal system. Explaining that the Framers never intended to
surrender control of state administration of criminal law to the federal
judiciary, Berger concludes that "the case of 'cruel and unusual punishment'
did not contemplate interference with State control of death penalties.""
Examining the history of the eighth amendment, Berger asserts that the
Supreme Court has interpreted the cruel and unusual punishment clause to
prohibit cruel, as well as excessive punishment. In Berger's view, however,
a punishment may be excessive without being cruel.' 7 According to Berger,
the Framers' choice of different terminology indicates a different purpose
and in fact, "the Founders were accustomed to punishments that by our
standards would be regarded as 'excessive,' and gave no inkling of an inten-
tion to bar them." 8 Furthermore, to violate the eighth amendment, a punish-
ment must be both cruel (barbarous) 9 and unusual (a significant departure
from the customary).2" Thus, while capital punishment may inevitably be
perceived as inherently cruel, it is not necessarily unusual. 2' For example,
while crucifixion would be "unusual according to today's standards," death
12. See supra note 1 (listing a bibliography of Berger's continuing indictment of the Supreme
Court's illegitimate law-making and judicial activism).
13. See DEATH PENALTIES, supra note 4, at 183-96.
14. Specifically, Berger addresses the law-making role of the Supreme Court and whether
constitutional interpretation should be confined to the Framers' intent or whether it should
be readjusted to meet current needs and ideals.
15. DEATH PENALTIES, supra note 4, at 15 n.24, 23-24 nn.68-70.
16. Id. at 28.
17. Id. at 30.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 39.
20. Id. at 41. Chief Justice Warren recognized: "If the word 'unusual' is to have any meaning
apart from the word 'cruel' . . . the meaning should be the ordinary one, signifying something
different than that which is ordinarily done." Id.
21. Id. But according to Berger, if a punishment is no longer customary, then it is both
cruel and unusual. Id.
1983]
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by injection would not. Therefore, only the former mode of capital punish-
ment would be unconstitutional on its face today.
Consonant with English precedent, the Framers did not intend to make
the death penalty unconstitutional per se. Indeed, coterminous with the enact-
ment and ratification of the Constitution, capital punishment applied to a
wide range of non-capital felonies which today are not considered to con-
stitute capital crimes. According to Berger:
The continued vitality of death penalties is further attested by the Act
of April 30, 1790, enacted by the selfsame First Congress, the best inter-
preter of what it meant by the "cruel and unusual" clause it adopted.
That Act made murder, forgery of public securities, robbery, and rape
punishable by death, incontrovertible evidence that the Framers did not
intend "cruel and unusual" to exclude death penalities.22
Berger is not a proponent of capital punishment per se; he opines it has
no intrinsic merit in the abstract. However, from a constitutional perspec-
tive, he makes an important and legitimate argument. Should the people
now wish to abolish capital punishment, they may do so constitutionally
by statute or formal amendment. Berger maintains that the critical and funda-
mental point is that the Constitution vests the power of abrogation or reaf-
firmation of capital punishment exclusively with the people, and not with
the judiciary.23 Thus, although it may be socially and morally commendable
to abolish capital punishment, that decision rests with the people: "by Arti-
cle V that power of amendment is reserved to the people, not given to the
Courts to exercise under the guise of 'interpretation'. . . . Nothing in the
Constitution, in my judgment, authorizes the Court to abolish the death
penalty." 
24
Undoubtedly, there is firm historical precedent for the gradual prohibi-
tion of certain forms of punishment through legislative action which prop-
erly reflects the collective will of the citizenry.25
[Plunishments such as branding and the cutting off of ears, which were
commonplace at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, passed from
the penal scene without judicial intervention because they became basi-
cally offensive to the people and the legislatures responded to this senti-
ment. At issue is not whether a man may be hanged for stealing a loaf
22. Id. at 47.
23. Id. at 48-49. "As concerns the states, in particular, the Constitution leaves them large
freedom to do what they like-and what the Justices may not like-subject only to the clearest
and narrowest limitation." Id. at 49-50 (emphasis in original). Therefore, as Berger argues,
it is clear that "the Framers did not intend to limit State control of death penalties." Id.
at 50, 67 (emphasis in original).
24. Id. at 58.
25. See id. at 41 (the punishment for treason, disembowelment while alive, survived until
it was abolished by Parliament); id. at 48 (Justice Brennan commented that concepts of justice
change, as exemplified by society's virtually total rejection of the death penalty); id. at 128
(punishments which were once commonplace, such as "cutting off of ears" became offensive
to the people, therefore, the legislature responded by abolishing the punishment).
[Vol. 32:211
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of bread, but whether the Court is authorized to take that decision away
from the legislature and the people.2
Therefore, Berger argues, the gross imposition of the judges' personal mores,
via the arrogance of unprincipled judicial fiat, is blatantly unconstitutional.
Echoing the central thesis of his earlier book, Government By Judiciary,"
Berger is unalterably opposed to judicial activism. Utmost restraint is the
only constitutionally legitimate federal judicial perspective regarding state ad-
ministration of capital punishment. Berger states that "at the root of the
Court's transformation of the 'cruel and unusual punishment' clause lies the
assumption that the Court is empowered to revise the Constitution, discreetly
expressed as 'adaption' to changing conditions. Such claims are garbled in
jewels of obfuscation." 2
Berger acknowledges former Chief Justice Marshall's famous characteriza-
tion of " 'a constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and conse-
quently to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs,' "29 and declares
that it is incontrovertible that ours is a "living" Constitution. Berger con-
cludes, however, that the Constitution must be modified and given vitality
by the people and the legislature, via the constitutional amendment mechanism
of Article V, and not by the Court's dangerous expansion of the fourteenth
amendment.3"
Berger terms Chief Justice Warren's remark that the eighth amendment
" 'must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society' "' as "a euphemism for judicial
soothsaying." 3 In summary, Berger dismisses judicial activism as "double
talk for amending the Constitution without consulting the people .... Simply
put, amendment is confined to the people under Article V." 3 3
Analyzing the controversial McGautha v. California34 and Furman v.
Georgia" decisions, Berger maintains that these decisions were wholly in-
26. Id. at 128.
27. According to Berger in GOVERNMENT By JUDIcIARY, supra note 1, at 300-11, 351-62,
the Supreme Court was not designed to act as a continuing constitutional convention and,
consequently, its continuing revision of the Constitution under the guise of interpretation far
exceeds the original intention of the Framers. Berger maintains that the Framers merely in-
tended the Court to police the boundaries drawn by the Constitution. Furthermore, he argues
that the original intention of the Framers should be binding on the present generation and
that the role of the Court is not to reinterpret the Constitution in light of current exigencies
or changed ideals.
28. DEATH PENALTIES, supra note 4, at 59.
29. Id. at 67.
30. Id. at 72.
31. Id. at 122.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 123.
34. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
35. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). The decision in McGautha, that unlimited discretion
in capital sentencing by juries was constitutionally permissible, is not necessarily inconsistent
19831
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imical to basic constitutional precepts. He argues that jury discretion regard-
ing the death penalty is, and must be, constitutionally immune from judicially
imposed constraints:
The historical evidence demonstrates that the Constitution left the States
free to enact death penalties unencumbered by any measure of propor-
tionality ...
The Court's attempt to impose and police 'standards' to curb jury discre-
tion in sentencing has even less constitutional footing and already has
resulted in a quagmire of contradictions. . . . Early on the Founders ex-
pressed their attachment to the common law mode of trial by jury,
whereunder juries could not be called upon to explain their verdicts nor
were judges empowered to review verdicts. The jury, in fact, was far closer
to the hearts of the Founders than was the judiciary; for protection they
looked to the jury rather than the judge.
• . . If the Court is free to substitute its own meaning for the establish-
ed common law content of the constitutional terms, it obliterates those
limits and revises the Constitution for the imposition of its own predilec-
tions on a people who, in the case of death penalties, lost no time in
repudiating the Court's reading of prevailing standards of 'human decen-
cy.' In turning its back on the practice that obtained at the adoption of
the Constitution and persisted for 181 years thereafter, the Court assumed
power to alter and amend the Constitution, a power exclusively reserved
to the people themselves, a power usurped by the Court disguised in
soothing double-talk. 6
By the abolitionists' own admission," the post-Furman standards pur-
portedly governing the imposition of capital punishment, severely restrained
jury discretion, and were an exercise in sheer futility. Apart from lacking
solid majorities,38 the landmark McGautha and Furman decisions were over
with the finding that a jury's decision to impose the death penalty was arbitrary and, hence,
unconstitutional. Because of the Furman Court's unwillingness to overrule McGautha, it
distinguished the two cases on the basis of the input to and the output from the jury. The
question of the permissability of jury sentencing standards was answered in McGautha to the
extent that it is constitutional not to impose standards. This determination, however, does not
preclude the future input of some sentencing standards to guide the jury. Thus, at the present,
the input to the jury is free of all constraints. In Furman, the Court found that juries ran-
domly were handing out death sentences and, therefore, struck down the death penalty in cases
where the results of the unguided jury were arbitrary. The effect of jury sentencing was thus
circumvented at the output stage in order to protect the rights of those being sentenced, without
disturbing the nature of the jury procedure. Although the Court in Furman did not explicitly
overrule McGautha, Berger states that "[t]his abrupt about-face exemplifies the very 'govern-
ment by whim' against which Justice Brennan inveighed in McGautha on the ground that ours
is a 'government of laws, not of men.' " DEATH PENALTIES, supra note 4, at 129.
36. DEATH PENALTIES, supra note 4, at 173, 174-75.
37. Id. at 176-77. Justice Marshall is foremost among the abolitionist justices and like most
abolitionists, prefers imprisonment to capital punishment. Id. at 177 n.10. According to Berger,
abolitionist reliance on the "cruel and unusual punishment" clause assumes that the Constitu-
tion endowed the Court with power to make selected portions of the Bill of Rights applicable
to the states. Furthermore, he claims that abolitionists assume that the Court may substitute
its present-day reading of the clause for the meaning the Framers intended. Id. at 173-74.
38. In McGautha, Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Black wrote
[Vol. 32:211
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360 pages in length and involved over fourteen separate opinions: the
quintessence of judicial convolution and obfuscation. It was evident in each
of these decisions that the justices were unable to convince either the nation
or one another of the legitimacy of their respective positions.
Berger concludes by proposing a legislative solution for judicial interference
with the states' constitutional power to administer capital punishment. Con-
gress should remedy this judicial intrusion by appropriately curtailing the
jurisdiction of the federal courts over the administration of criminal law.39
Berger fails, however, to enunciate the scheme for congressional action. He
simply suggests a draconian solution,"' with little consideration of either the
implementation or ramifications of his proposal.
Following this brief discussion of his proposed solution, Berger launches
into a diatribe against his academic critics, particularly Stanford Law School
Professor Paul Brest." He argues that "[tihose who do not share Paul Brest's
belief that the Court is not bound by the Constitution, who consider that
its revision was confined to the people, not the Court, should welcome the
exercise of congressional power to restore the democratic system of self-
government.''4
The academic furor regarding the constitutionality of capital punishment
rages among abolitionists/activists, strict interpretivists, and satellite theorists.
Death Penalties presents Berger's strict interpretivist plea for judicial restraint.
Unfortunately, the book is one part scholarship, two parts advocate's brief,
and two parts castigation of real and perceived critics.
Berger makes a facially impressive argument. Nonetheless, the stridency
of his personal diatribe detracts from the cogency of his thesis. Neither Berger
nor his critics have an absolute monopoly on the constitutional "truth."
Continual reinterpretation (read: manipulation) of the intent of the Framers,
though often critically necessary, is nevertheless extremely wearisome. Before
an immediate rejoinder to Professor Berger, perhaps the legal field would
be best served by a period of academic reflection.
a separate opinion, and Justice Douglas wrote the dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall. Justice Brennan also wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Douglas
and Marshall. In Furman, Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, and Marshall each wrote
a concurring opinion. Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehn-
quist, wrote the dissenting opinion. Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist also each wrote
a dissent.
39. DEATH PENALTIES, supra note 4, at 154.
40. Id. at 171-72.
41. Id. at 183-96. Referring critically to Professor Brest's scholarship, Berger rejoins: "His
critique of my views is therefore merely mud-slinging, the more since he patently has been
influenced by them." Id. at 187 n.26. Berger further asserts that "it is dispiriting to find that
my prior refutation of his criticism has not deterred him from repeating his misrepresentations
of my position. That goes beyond the issue of his credibility. Given academe's current infatua-
tion with judicial activism, he [Brest] owes a duty both to scholarship and to the people to
state an opponent's view honestly and fairly. Instead he flails away at strawmen of his own
devising." Id. at 187-88.
42. Id. at 172.
1983]
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At the conclusion of the book, one realizes that Berger, in this latest re-
examination of the "true" intent of the Framers of the eighth and four-
teenth amendments, has discounted his earlier valuable advice: "We must
be wary of reading our sentiments back into the minds of the framers."''
Both Berger and his activist critics are virulent advocates of their respec-
tive positions regarding the constitutionality of the death penalty. Berger
responds "Hallelujah" to Professor Brest's acknowledgment that " 'most
of our writings [concerning judicial review] are not political theory but ad-
vocacy scholarship-amicus briefs ultimately designed to persuade the Court
to adopt our various notions of the public good.' ""
Regardless of one's personal assessment of Berger's position, clearly the
minority view in recent years,"5 he continues to make a persuasive case for
restoring criminal law administration of capital punishment to the states.
Despite Berger's fulminations, his central thesis is scholarly, and his con-
clusion merits serious reflection. Indeed, Berger's countervailing position to
judicial activism deserves thoughtful attention by everyone interested in
criminal law administration of capital punishment.
We are therefore entitled to look behind every decision contrary to ma-
joritarian wishes in order to be satisfied that the Constitution, rather than
the Justices, bars the way. That emphatically is not the case with the "cruel
and unusual punishments" clause, which the Court once again uses as
a vehicle to impose its own morals on the people."1
43. DEATH PENALTIES, supra note 4, at 57.
44. Id. at 196.
45. Id. at 122. The abolitionists/activists represent the major trend today in constitutional
interpretation. In Chief Justice Warren's words, the Constitution "must draw its meaning from
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Id. at 122
n.42. Berger rejects this evolving interpretation of the Constitution, maintaining that such judicial
activism has distorted its original and limited meaning. For a discussion of Berger's position
on the role of the Supreme Court, see generally GOVERNMENT By JUDICIARY, supra note 1.
46. DEATH PENALTIES, supra note 4, at 103.
[Vol. 32:211
